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Abstract. According to what Robert Koch termed the
etiological standpoint, illnesses are best understood
and controlled by focusing on their causes, including
in their deﬁnitions and, thus, in the construction of
their taxonomies. In some ways ﬂawed, this stand-
point has been misunderstood and misapplied. A
taxonomy based solely on etiology was an unrealistic
dream in the context of ‘the bacteriological revolu-
tion’, and it also is unrealistic in the present context
of ‘the genetic revolution.’ We argue that the illnesses
in a taxonomy of them are in some cases best deﬁned
directly in terms of their respective somatic anoma-
lies, in some others indirectly by the unique and
universal etiology of that anomaly (left unspeciﬁed)
in a ‘deeper’ somatic anomaly, and in yet others as a
combination of these; and when the somatic anomaly
for direct deﬁnition remains unknown, it is to be
deﬁned indirectly by the clinical syndrome that is its
patient-relevant manifestation, possibly in conjunc-
tion with a somatic cause. We note, also, that these
taxonomic issues have no material bearing on epi-
demiologists’ etiologic research for the knowledge
base of community-level preventive medicine.
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Introduction
K.C. Carter [1], a philosopher who ‘wanted to ﬁnd
out what doctors were trained to believe,’ opened his
recent treatise on ‘causal concepts of disease’ thus:
Of the numerous changes that have occurred in medical thinking
over the last two centuries, none have been more consequential
than the adoption of what Robert Koch called the etiological
standpoint [ref.].
Carter explained this standpoint to be ‘the belief
that diseases are best controlled and understood by
means of causes’ and, in particular, ones that are
natural, necessary, and universal (same in each in-
stance of the disease). ‘This way of conceiving disease
has dominated medical thought for the last century,’
he noted.
H.R. Wulﬀ [2], a physician famous for his ‘Ra-
tional Diagnosis and Treatment’ book, for example,
characterized the 19th century redeﬁnition of diseases
on the basis of ‘the identity of the microorganism’ as
‘an important phase in the disease classiﬁcation as it
strengthened the false idea of monocausal determi-
nation of diseases’. He characterized the microor-
ganism – speciﬁc, unique – as representing only one
of the causes of an infectious disease, even though a
necessary one.
A.S. Evans [3], a physician eminent in microbiol-
ogy and epidemiology, took issue with the idea of
‘the’ microorganism in what already was understood
to be the multifactorial causation of infectious dis-
eases: ‘the idea that an infectious malady can be
caused only by the action of a single agent is incor-
rect’; ‘it became apparent about 1960 that a number
of common illnesses or syndromes existed in which
several agents could produce the same clinical pic-
ture’. Highly illustrative of this is the recent history of
the virology of hepatitis [4].
While the microbiological thinking about the
etiology of infectious diseases has been evolving
through revisions, two ideas in this have not:
microbial agents continue to be viewed as causes of
infectious diseases and such causation as deﬁni-
tional to infectious diseases. Koch, having ‘proven’
the tubercle bacillus (mycobacterium tuberculosis,
var. hominis) to be ‘the’ cause of tuberculosis (of
the pathology of it), ‘deﬁned tuberculosis as infes-
tation by the tubercle bacillus’ [1], and that deﬁ-
nition scarcely would be challenged at present even
if it be understood that ‘the tubercle bacillus is
universally necessary for tuberculosis only because
‘‘tuberculosis’’ is deﬁned as infection by this bacil-
lus’ [1]. This dual role for the microorganism(s) in
the concept of any infectious disease persists,
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arguably at least, because of continual failure to
appreciate that ‘an eﬀect – the disease – should not
be confused with its own cause’ [5].
The developments in the deﬁnitions of infectious
diseases in the latter half of the 19th century soon
became paradigmal in respect to other illnesses
also. Thus, the point was made in 1884 that
‘symptomatology and pathological anatomy could
not signiﬁcantly advance the comprehension of any
disease’; that the comprehension ‘required following
the model of bacterial theory’ [1]. Sigmund Freud,
among others, paid heed; and so it was, for
example, that before the century had drawn to its
close, ‘the sexual etiology of hysteria had become
deﬁnitional’ [1].
Through much of the 20th century ‘the model of
the bacterial theory’ got to be followed quite lit-
erally by the many eminent ‘alienists’ – psychiatrists
– who took various mental illnesses to be caused by
‘focal infection’ and on this basis committed, or
condoned, unconscionable surgical enormities in
mental hospitals [6].
Most recently this hubris, in terms of which ‘the
practical payoﬀs of the bacteriological revolution
seemed limitless’ [6], has been matched, if not
superseded, by another:
The human genome sequence will dramatically alter how we
define, prevent, and treat disease. We need to define the term
disease so that it incorporates our expanding genetic knowl-
edge, ... With recent dramatic advances in genetics and genom-
ics, essentialists could argue that the essential lesion defining
the disease state is a genetic abnormality [7].
Doctors in both clinical and community medicine,
and clinical and epidemiological researchers also,
indeed need to adopt a concept of disease (morbus) –
and of defect (vitium) and injury (trauma) besides [8] –
consistent with most recent understandings, including
as for the proper role of etiology in this. But the
larger need is to achieve a suitable taxonomy of the
component entities of ill-health, again including in
respect to the role of etiology in this – if any.
Given that epidemiological research typically is
concerned with the etiology of entities of ill-health –
of illnesses, that is [8] – it is particularly important for
research epidemiologists to be clear on whether their
etiologic research addresses something that already
is, or in the future might become, deﬁnitional to the
illness at issue in any given study; or whether, instead,
at issue in each study is something dependent on a
rational taxonomy of illnesses but having no bearing
on such deﬁnitions. Toward properly answering these
questions, the point of departure naturally is critical
understanding of Koch’s ideas on etiologic deﬁnition
of illnesses.
‘The etiological standpoint’
That ‘the etiological standpoint’ of Koch ‘has domi-
nated medical thought for the last century’ is under-
standable, not only on the grounds of Koch’s great
authority – very well deserved – but also because of
its obvious correctness in the context in which he
advocated this standpoint. For, no one can take issue
with, for example, the idea that phthisis (consump-
tion, wasting), and scrofula (brood sow, king’s evil)
also, is ‘best controlled and understood by means of
its cause’ in the proliferation of (a particular type of)
mycobacteria in the lung parenchyma and lymph
nodes, respectively.
To take one other, analogous and quite recent
example, what was called hepatitis was a clinical
concept of an aggregate of symptoms and signs
attributed to the liver – though not to inﬂammation
of it – in the Hippocratic Corpus already [4]. But the
clinical syndrome obviously is best understood and
controlled when appreciating its now-recognized
causation in, speciﬁcally, inﬂammation of the liver,
and the latter by means of its most recently under-
stood causes in viral infections.
This standpoint has, however, been misunderstood
and misused. Early on, Freud ‘repeatedly exploited
the tactic of redeﬁning diseases in terms of causes’ [1].
But the relation of clinical hysteria to sexual traumas
in early childhood, to take this example, is not
analogous with the relation of, say, phthisis to
tuberculosis (tissue nodosity) nor with the relation of
the latter to the mycobacterium’s proliferation in the
aﬀected tissue. Those purported causes of hysteria are
matters of the past and thereby not, even in principle,
subject to removal as a therapeutic intervention. By
contrast, even though the notion of ‘focal infection’
as a ubiquitous cause of mental illness was deﬁnitely
wrong and utterly tragic in its implications for the
practice of ‘scientiﬁc’ medicine, it could in principle
have been a salient example of the usefulness of the
etiological standpoint.
Misunderstanding of the etiological standpoint has
resulted, we suggest, from a common failure to
appreciate an implicit but important subtlety in it:
Etiology in Koch’s standpoint has two meanings. It
refers, for one, to the causation of the patient’s
manifest ill-health – sickness [9] – in its underlying
somatic anomaly. In the main, however, his etiolog-
ical standpoint concerns a sickness-producing
somatic anomaly’s etiology in its underlying somatic
anomaly and the latter in the particular meaning of
the ‘deeper,’ primary anomaly being still present and
continually sustaining the more ‘superﬁcial,’ second-
ary one or its progression. A prime example is the
etiology of tuberculosis in mycobacteriosis.
Failure to exemplify this special, limited meaning
of etiology makes Freud’s etiologic deﬁnitions of
neuroses and psychoses not to conform to Koch’s
etiological standpoint and, thereby, not to possess the
practical and conceptual usefulness of this. Venous
thrombosis is etiologic to pulmonary embolism, and
peptic ulcer to peritonitis, but neither one of these
relations – between a somatic anomaly and its
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complication – exempliﬁes the etiological standpoint
of Koch, to say nothing about the relation – non-
causal – of sequelae to their precursor anomalies in
diseases or injuries [10]. But that standpoint is
exempliﬁed by the etiology of pulmonary edema in
failure of the left ventricle of the heart, and that of the
latter in aortic stenosis, though without the necessity
(and suﬃciency) of the cause.
When the concern is to deﬁne ‘diseases’ genetically,
disease is said to be construed as ‘a state that places
individuals at increased risk of adverse consequences’
(emphases deleted) [7]; but again, this is not what
Koch’s etiological standpoint was about. That
standpoint – and more – would be left behind when
deﬁning diseases in terms of, say, the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genes or trisomy 21, as removal of these
causes would not ameliorate what patients with these
anomalies actually are suﬀering from, if anything. It
is, thus, only outside the etiological standpoint – in
Koch’s original meaning – and with disregard for
other established patterns of medical thought that
‘essentialists could argue that the essential lesion
deﬁning the disease state is a genetic anomaly.’
An agent as the/a cause of an illness
Koch’s ‘proof’ of the tubercle bacillus as being ‘the
cause of tuberculosis’ was, in generic terms, a pur-
ported demonstration of an agent as being patho-
genic – causal to an illness – in the limited meaning of
etiology inherent in his etiological standpoint (see
above). He indeed wrote about ‘the parasite as the
cause of the disease’ [1]; and Wulﬀ and Evans, for
example, wrote about microorganisms as causes of
infectious diseases (cf. above).
In respect to infectious diseases in the meaning of
the likes of tuberculosis and hepatitis – as distinct
from infectious diseases such as cervical cancer –
there can be no question about the involvement of
the/a microorganism in the disease process itself. But
as for the causality of this involvement, the question
here is whether the microorganism per se is a cause of
the disease, as commonly is asserted.
In Koch’s ‘proof’ that the mycobacterium is causal
to tuberculosis, the ﬁnal step was – in his own words –
to ‘show that animals inoculated with pure culture [of
the bacillus] contract the original disease [i.e., the
tuberculosis in the source of the cultivated bacillus]’ [1].
But to us this does not show that the bacillus per se is
causal to tuberculosis. To us this shows, instead, that
inoculation with the bacillus is a cause of the disease –
ormore generally, that opportunity for the agent’s entry
to the host is a cause of the disease in the host.
Even when saying, in the modern framework of
multifactorial etiologic thought about infectious dis-
eases, that a microorganism is among the causes [2,
3], one is oblivious to the now generally understood
truth that the cause of an infectious disease always is
a person’s exposure to the/a relevant microorganism
(rather than the microorganism per se) in conjunction
with the person’s susceptibility thereby to contract the
disease – with each of these two major generic causes,
each necessary but insuﬃcient, encompassing multi-
ple component causes.
The mycobacterium per se thus is not even a
component cause of tuberculosis, just as thalidomide
in unused pills cannot be etiologic to phocomelia or
benzpyrene in uninhaled cigarette smoke to lung
cancer. But various component causes in these
examples have to do with those agents – exposure or
susceptibility to them. It thus is not without reason
that exposure is so central a concept in epidemiology
(even if universally applicable only to environmental
factors, never to constitutional ones, and only selec-
tively to behavioral ones.)
An agent’s activity as the essence of an illness
An illness, like anything else, is properly deﬁned by
specifying its essence – that which is present in all
instances of it and unique to it.
When Koch redeﬁned tuberculosis as ‘infestation
by the tubercle bacillus,’ he implied that all cases of
tuberculosis are characterized by infestation with the
tubercle bacillus, and not only uniquely but also
causally so; and causal in this context he indeed
understood to be not the bacillus per se (cf. above)
but infestation with it – meaning the parasite’s entry
into the body followed by its proliferation within the
body, this as a necessary and suﬃcient cause.
These implications of the redeﬁnition can still be
viewed as tenable (except, perhaps, the implied non-
existence of healthy carriers of the bacillus, inherent
in the uniqueness implication). From this it does not
follow, however, that the redeﬁnition remains – or
ever was – justiﬁable.
The truth of the matter, pure and simple, is this:
Whereas phthisis had been a recognized entity of
sickness, and pathologists had recognized (a partic-
ular type of) tissue tuberculosis (nodosity) to be
causal to it, Koch’s bacteriological work led to the
discovery of mycobacteriosis as ‘the’ cause of tuber-
culosis. And momentous though this bacteriological
discovery was, it should not have been taken to have
bearing on the deﬁnitional essence of tuberculosis as
a pathological entity, much less did it call for, or
justify, redeﬁnition of the corresponding clinical
concept of sickness – phthisis – in bacteriological
terms. For, ‘an eﬀect – disease [the anomaly on a
more superﬁcial level] – should not be confused with
its own cause [in an anomaly on a deeper level].’ Even
though etiologically related, the entities on the three
levels are mutually distinct, requiring separate deﬁ-
nitions, and separate terms also. If pulmonary edema
were known always to be caused by congestive heart
failure, this would not justify redeﬁning the former as
being the latter.
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Koch’s bacterial redeﬁnition of tuberculosis and
other infectious diseases thus was unjustiﬁable as
such, and it therefore unjustiﬁably became a para-
digm for etiologic deﬁnitions of illnesses in general –
and, misguidedly, even in respect to etiologies that do
not ﬁt into the etiological standpoint which concerns,
to say it again, synchronous anomalies one of which
sustains the other or its progression.
Etiology as the essence of an illness
The concept of etiology has undergone an evolution in
the context of infectious diseases, and quite generally
also. Tuberculosis as a somatic anomaly is no longer
thought of as being ‘etiologic’ to the sickness entity
phthisis, nor is coronary stenosis viewed as ‘etiologic’
to angina pectoris. Sickness in an illness is now
thought of as the patient-relevant manifestation of the
illness, with the latter construed as a somatic anomaly
with potential for such manifestation, and etiologic
attention now focuses on the genesis of the illness-
deﬁning somatic anomaly. Descriptively the anomaly
deﬁning a disease or a defect is the result of its
pathogenesis, and etiology now is taken to be the
etiogenesis of that anomaly – the aggregate of causal
inﬂuences initiating and/or advancing pathogenesis [11].
When etiology E, in this meaning, is taken/deﬁned
to be the essence of illness I, deﬁnitional to I is its
E-etiology alone and, thus, not at all the particular
nature of the resulting somatic anomaly. For exam-
ple, when an illness is deﬁned by infestation with
mycobacteria in – mycobacteriosis of – the lungs, and
this not as the illness but as the etiology of it, the
essence/deﬁnition of the illness itself is: the (further)
somatic anomaly (or anomalies) caused by (the pri-
mary anomaly of) pulmonary mycobacteriosis. That
this illness is generally characterized by tuberculosis/
nodosity of the lung parenchyma is not at all deﬁni-
tional to this etiologically deﬁned illness. Diﬀerent
from this example, syphilis – ‘the great imitator’ –
really needs to be deﬁned by the infestation (spiro-
chetosis) speciﬁc to it, this as the etiology of the
multitudinous anomalies resulting from this cause.
Etiological deﬁnition is natural for a multitude of
infectious diseases so long as the etiology is taken to
be the infestation rather than the etiology of this (in
exposure and susceptibility to the microorganism(s)
involved), and for many other illnesses besides.
Generic examples of those other illnesses are condi-
tions of poisonings and vitamin deﬁciencies, both of
which involve an anomalous somatic state as the
etiology, akin to the infestation in an infectious dis-
ease. Various metabolic anomalies can be deﬁned by
their endocrinological etiology instead of the nature
of the metabolic anomaly itself; and the etiological
deﬁnition of the anomaly can also be genetic, as an
alternative to inability to metabolize phenylalanine,
for example.
Etiology in the essence of an illness
Some illnesses, while deﬁned as a somatic anomaly of
a given type as a ﬁrst approximation, gain a more
speciﬁc deﬁnition of the nature of this by reference to
a particular one of its various etiologies in a somatic
anomaly of a diﬀerent kind. Thus, while pneumonia
is any inﬂammation of the lungs, it is useful to bring
etiology into the concept and thus to have the more
speciﬁc concepts of anthrax pneumonia and aspira-
tion pneumonia, for example. And while myocardial
infarction is the formation of ischemic necrosis in the
myocardium, it is useful to distinguish subtypes for
this according to etiology in coronary thrombosis and
other somatic causes.
On the other hand, bringing trisomy (or translo-
cation) of chromosome 21 into the deﬁnition of
Down’s syndrome provides no further speciﬁcity to
this syndrome. There thus are these two options:
deﬁnition of the syndrome by its particulars and
without any reference to its etiology, or deﬁnition of
it as the syndrome caused by trisomy (or transloca-
tion) of chromosome 21 and without reference to the
syndrome’s particulars. For when it is said that a
concept’s deﬁnition speciﬁes that which is present in
all instances of it and unique to it, implicitly meant is
that a proper deﬁnition involves nothing but this.
Etiology in a taxonomy of illnesses
Once illnesses have been deﬁned, a taxonomy of ill-
nesses is the classiﬁcation of illnesses resulting from
this – so long as the deﬁned illnesses/anomalies con-
stitute a set of mutually exclusive and all-inclusive
categories/taxa.
Defects and injuries naturally are generally deﬁned
directly, by the nature of the anomaly, ventricular
septal defect and hip fracture, for example; but some
may be more advantageously deﬁned indirectly, by
their etiology, trisomy 21 syndrome and cerebral
concussion, for example. As for diseases, some need
to be deﬁned directly, malignant and atherosclerotic
anomalies, for example; but etiologic deﬁnition is
natural for others, infectious diseases and vitamin
deﬁciencies, for example.
We presume it to be abundantly clear from he
foregoing that a taxonomy based solely on etiology
was an unrealistic dream in the context of ‘the bac-
teriological revolution,’ and that it also is unrealistic
in the present context of ‘the genetic revolution.’
Etiology in epidemiological objects of study
Etiology in the meaning of Koch’s etiological
standpoint has not been seen as a natural concern in
epidemiologists’ etiologic research; and thus, etiology
in that meaning has in all essence been the province of
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laboratory and clinical researchers only. As for
genetic etiology, epidemiologists used to distinguish
themselves from geneticists by a focus on nongenetic
etiology with the idea that relevance to community-
level preventive medicine requires this. These dis-
tinctions have, however, become rather blurred upon
the advent of, notably, ‘molecular epidemiology’ and
‘genetic epidemiology,’ and ‘clinical epidemiology’
besides.
To the extent that epidemiologic researchers con-
tinue to see themselves in the service of public health
in the particular meaning of developing the knowl-
edge base for community-level preventive medicine
through etiologic research, it does not matter to them
whether illness anomalies are deﬁned indirectly by
clinical syndromes such as idiopathic low-back pain,
directly as somatic anomalies, or indirectly by
somatic etiology of these, genetically perhaps. The
pragmatic preventive-medicine standpoint does,
however, continue to call for focus on potential
etiologic factors subject to community-level inter-
vention, factors environmental and behavioral in the
main, but constitutional also, as in the need for
immunization. Even genetic anomalies can have
prevention-relevant environmental or behavioral eti-
ology, and so can acquired constitutional
susceptibility to illness, that of AIDS, for example.
Etiologic research of this type can have the side-
eﬀect of misguidedly obfuscating the taxonomy of
illnesses, leading to concepts such as ‘occupational
lung cancer.’ Properly, lung cancer is construed as
that which this term implies, as cancer originating in
the lungs. It has no ‘occupational’ subtype(s); only its
etiology does.
Specialties of epidemiological practice of
community-level preventive medicine each have their
particular sets of illnesses of concern, diﬀerent among
occupational epidemiology, nutritional epidemiol-
ogy, infectious-disease epidemiology, etc. The set of
these sets, however, does not constitute an etiologic
taxonomy of illnesses on an aggregative level, as the
categories in this are neither mutually exclusive nor
all-inclusive.
Finally, a point about the operational deﬁnition of
the illness outcome in epidemiological research on
etiology. The present routine is to include in the case
series all cases of the illness identiﬁed – by rule-in
diagnosis in routine practice – in the study base. But a
serious validity problem can arise from the etiologic
history being a criterion in many of the diagnoses, as
when studying the etiology of pulmonary embolism
in oral-contraceptive use. This problem can be
obviated, largely or even totally perhaps, by
restricting the case series to instances of the illness
that are severe and typical [12]. For these cases come
to medical attention irrespective of the history at is-
sue, and they are prone to be diagnosed without that
history having a role in it.
References
1. Carter KC. The Rise of Causal Concepts of Disease.
Case Histories. Hants (UK): Ashgate Publishing
Company, 2003, pp. vii, 1, 38, 52, 135, 147, 152, 158.
2. Wulﬀ HR. The causal basis of the current disease
classiﬁcation. In: Nordenfeld L and Lindahl BIB (eds):
Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine.
Dordrecht: D Reidel Publishing Company, 1984.
3. Evans AS. Causation and disease: The Henle–Koch
postulates revisites. Yale J Biol Med 1976; 49: 175–195.
4. Duﬃn J. Lovers and Livers. Disease Concepts in His-
tory. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005, pp.
85, 87, 97.
5. Scadding JG. Essentialism and nominalism in medi-
cine: Logic of diagnosis in disease terminology. Lancet
1996; 348: 594–596.
6. Scull A. Madhouse. A Tragic Tale of Megalomania
and Modern Medicine. New Haven (CT): Yale Uni-
versity Press, 2005, 28 ppﬀ.
7. Temple LKF, McLeod RS, Gallinger S, Wright JG.
Deﬁning disease in the genomics era. Science 2001; 293:
807–808.
8. Miettinen OS, Flegel KM. Elementary concepts of
medicine: III. Illness somatic anomaly with . . . J Eval
Clin Pract 2003; 9: 315–317.
9. Miettinen OS, Flegel KM. Elementary concepts of
medicine: IV. Sickness from illness and in health. J Eval
Clin Pract 2003; 9: 319–320.
10. Miettinen OS, Flegel KM. Elementary concepts of
medicine: VII. Course of illness: manifestations, com-
plications, outcome. J Eval Clin Pract 2003; 9: 329–331.
11. Miettinen OS, Flegel KM. Elementary concepts of
medicine: VI. Genesis of illness: pathogenesis, aetio-
genesis. J Eval Clin Pract 2003; 9: 325–327.
12. Miettinen OS. Etiologic research: needed revisions of
concepts and principles. Scand J Work Environ Health
1999; 25: 484–490.
Address for correspondence: Johann Steurer, Horten Zen-
trum fu¨r praxisorientierte Forschung und Wissenstransfer,
Universita¨tsspital Zu¨rich, CH-8091, Zu¨rich, Schweiz
Phone: +41-1-255-31-98; Fax: +41-1-255-397-20;
E-mail: johann.steurer@usz.ch
89
